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Alan Riley and Frank Umbach | An immanent threat of significant gas shortfalls 
further jeopardizes Russia’s status as a reliable energy partner. The supply 
gap that Gazprom faces has severe implications for European importers and 
EU energy policy in general. The European Union must diversify its natural 
gas imports and expand other energy sources—including nuclear power.
EU heads of state and government are 
in the process of adopting an energy 
action plan that includes a common 
foreign policy on energy issues. Its 
goal is to allow the European Union 
to speak “with one voice” to its ener-
gy partners, above all to Russia. Since 
Putin and the siloviki, the former se-
curity officials who make up today’s 
political and economic elite, regard 
energy and pipeline policy as the most 
important instrument of Russian for-
eign policy, the need for concerted 
action is greater than ever. Even after 
the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict in 
January 2006, they have continued to 
use Russia’s gas resources as a means 
to apply political pressure on Lithua-
nia, Moldova, Georgia, and Belarus. 
Raising energy prices to “market lev-
els” has always been a way to gain 
control of pipelines, refineries, and 
additional energy infrastructure in 
Eurasia as well as to expand Russia’s 
monopolies. 
So far, the European Union has 
been unsuccessful in persuading 
Russia to pursue a market-oriented 
energy policy or in aligning the “EU-
Russian energy partnership” with 
market principles. As a consequence, 
the European Union is now seeking, 
among other things, to diversify its 
energy imports in order to reduce its 
dependence on Russian energy, par-
ticularly natural gas. For its part, 
Russia’s reputation as a reliable EU 
energy partner is undermined by the 
imminent threat of a dramatic gas 
shortfall—one that, until mid-2006, 
both Moscow and Gazprom’s Euro-
pean energy partners denied could 
happen. Although Putin finally ac-
knowledged this supply gap in do-
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mestic discussions in September 
2006, he did not reveal its full scope, 
which is all-important for the Euro-
pean Union.
At first glance, supply shortages 
would seem an impossibility in Rus-
sia, which not only boasts over 47 
billion cubic meters of natural gas 
reserves (26 percent of global re-
serves) but meets 50 percent of its 
own domestic energy demand. How-
ever, fears of a gas shortfall are well 
founded. Russian and foreign con-
sumers are threatened by supply dis-
ruptions that will cast even greater 
doubt on Russia’s reputation as a 
reliable energy supplier and perma-
nently harm foreign gas sales, which 
are crucial for Russia’s economic 
development and tax revenues.
There are two main reasons for 
the Russian gas crisis: 1) the decline 
in output from the 
vast natural gas 
fields in the region 
of  Nadym Pur Taz 
(NPT), and 2) an 
unwillingness on 
the part of the state energy giant 
Gazprom to make timely investments 
in developing new fields. Although 
Gazprom has adequate capital, it has 
failed to develop any major new 
fields apart from the gas deposits in 
Zapolyarnoye, which can mitigate 
the effects of the NPT decline only 
for a short time. There are, in turn, 
seven reasons for this unwillingness 
to invest: 
 • Most of the natural gas extracted 
by Gazprom is not destined for the 
lucrative foreign market. It is sold on 
the Russian market at subsidized 
prices that are considered far too 
low. This makes it considerably more 
difficult to invest in new fields and 
the required infrastructure.2 While it 
is true that, by 2011, Russia plans to 
double the domestic price of gas to 
$90 per 1,000 cubic meters, signifi-
cant price increases are unlikely in 
the run-up to the March 2008 presi-
dential elections. 
 • Despite high profits from foreign 
sales, the Gazprom Group has been 
saddled by heavy debt of $38 billion 
ever since it took over Sibneft. Fur-
ther, there is evidence to suggest that 
Gazprom’s additional income is con-
sumed by high operational costs.
 • The Russian financial system is 
too weak to provide the necessary 
capital to tap vast gas reserves. The 
Yamal region in western Siberia, for 
instance, will cost a total of $70 bil-
lion to develop. The decision by Gaz-
prom executives to exploit the natu-
ral gas deposits in Schtokman with-
out foreign partners will further in-
crease strains on capital resources 
that are already at record levels.
 • In the space of three years (2003–
2006), Gazprom spent nearly 18 billion 
euros on stakes in companies outside 
the gas sector. It had the strong support 
of the Kremlin and was essentially act-
ing in the Kremlin’s interests (e.g. pur-
chasing media companies so they could 
be subject to state control). Gazprom 
has pursued “policies targeted to in-
crease the Russian state’s influence in 
these sectors....This is more than had 
been invested in the development of 
upstream gas production in  decade.”1 
When Gazprom does make invest-
ments, these are focused on foreign ac-
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1) Vladimir Milov, “The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue: Competition versus Monopolies,” Russie.
Nei.Visions, No. 13, September 2006, p. 8.
2) See Jonathan P. Stern, The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom, Oxford 2006, p. 37.
The Russian financial system 
is too weak to provide the 
necessary capital to tap 
vast gas reserves. 
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quisitions (such as those in Central 
Asia) and export infrastructure, not on 
constructing and modernizing domes-
tic pipelines or developing new natural 
gas fields. 
 • There may be a few individual for-
eign investors who are willing to in-
vest billions in Russian deals under 
increasingly uncertain political condi-
tions. But $70 billion is a great deal 
more than most of the large energy 
corporations—even acting in a con-
sortium—are willing to pay without 
stronger legal protection for investors’ 
rights. Because economic circum-
stances have changed, the Russian 
government is now undermining pro-
duction agreements that were signed 
in a period of low energy prices in the 
early 1990s, but its flaunting of con-
tractual agreements will permanently 
scare off investors in the future. 
 • Western investors are not permit-
ted to hold more than 49 percent of a 
Russian company. This limitation is 
unlikely to dispel reservations or cre-
ate an investment-friendly climate in 
Russia. 
 • Finally, direct foreign investment 
is largely unwelcome in Russia. In 
practice, Western shareholders of 
Russian energy companies must gen-
erally content themselves with small 
stakes. 
Former deputy energy minister 
Vladimir Milov warns that this un-
willingness to invest will have dire 
consequences—as shown by the 
table below.3 
These figures are buttressed by 
the findings of the International En-
ergy Agency (IEA), which estimates 
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3) Vladimir Milov, Leonard Coburn, and Ingor Danchenko, “Russia’s Energy Policy 1992-2005,” 
Eurasian Geography and Economics, 47, 3 (2006), p. 305.
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output will decline by 20 bcm per 
year.4 Based on current demand, this 
will result in a supply shortfall of 
200 bcm by 2015. The Russian Insti-
tute of Natural Monopolies Research 
has arrived at similar figures.5 In its 
analysis, it put the annual shortfall 
at 120 to 123 bcm by 2010 and 186 to 
343 bcm by 2020. 
In early summer 
2006, NIIgazko-
nomika—a gas in-
dustry research in-
stitute and a sub-
sidiary of Gazprom—proposed that 
Gazprom radically change its strate-
gy: Russia, it said, should reduce its 
natural gas exports to European mar-
kets and concentrate instead on de-
veloping new gas fields to satisfy 
domestic demand. This demand will 
grow to 654 bcm per year by 2020—a 
figure that dwarfs the estimates of 
436 bcm per year in Russia’s 2003 
energy strategy.6 
Milov’s figures are optimistic. 
They are based on the assumption 
that Gazprom will be able to main-
tain gas production of about 550 bcm 
per year. There are two reasons that 
this is too optimistic: in the first 
place, the smaller NPT fields will be 
considerably more difficult to exploit, 
while it will take time to put the large 
Yamal plants into operation. Second-
ly, it is unclear whether the remain-
ing NPT deposits can be extracted 
both efficiently and profitably. Out-
put could be adversely affected by 
higher production costs or by damage 
resulting from overproduction in the 
Soviet age. In addition, one must also 
question Gazprom’s commercial 
strategy in Central Asia. 
In view of the many unknowables 
and the lack of information, it is dif-
ficult to make an accurate prediction 
about the magnitude of the supply 
shortfall in 2010. However, Russia 
and the European Union can count 
themselves lucky if it does not ex-
ceed 126 bcm. 
Russian Solutions 
Russia sees two possible solutions. 
First, independent gas suppliers 
could partially close the supply gap if 
the Russian domestic market were 
made more attractive by raising pric-
es. Russia’s 2003 national energy 
strategy foresees independent com-
panies covering roughly 20 percent 
of natural gas demand by 2020 (com-
pared with 13 percent now). Based 
on its own projections, the IEA hopes 
that independent suppliers will ac-
count for 40 percent of the market in 
2015—meaning deliveries of 260 to 
290 bcm of natural gas. Even so, No-
vatek and TNK/BP are probably the 
only companies capable of making a 
substantial contribution. Reserve 
levels and available capital are al-
ready placing limits on gas-produc-
ing oil companies like Rosneft, which 
are also being lured by the prospect 
of greater profits in the oil business. 
This means that the more conserva-
tive approach in the 2003 national 
energy strategy, which envisions a 
contribution of 120 to 135 bcm, or 
perhaps even 150 bcm in 2015, is 
probably more realistic. 
Moreover, the amount of gas con-
4) International Energy Agency, Optimising Russian Natural Gas: Reform and Climate Policy (2006), 
p. 34.
5) Freedholm, Gazprom in Crisis (Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2006), p. 11.
6) Energy Strategy of the Russian Federations until 2020, Moscow 2003.
Reserve levels and available 
capital are already placing 
limits on gas-producing oil 
companies like Rosneft.
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tributed by independent companies 
will depend on their capital resourc-
es and on formal guarantees by Gaz-
prom that they will be able to utilize 
its network. At the moment, both are 
highly questionable since they un-
dermine the vision of a vertically 
integrated energy behemoth con-
trolled by the Kremlin. In the future, 
independent companies are likely to 
face even greater restrictions in ac-
cessing Gazprom’s network. The 
more quickly Gazprom depletes its 
own reserves, the more companies it 
will need to purchase to make up for 
its gas shortfall. In such a scenario, it 
is extremely doubtful that the weak-
ened, once-independent companies 
taken over by Gazprom will be able to 
maintain their high production levels.
The second solution—one favored 
by Putin, but criticized by the eco-
nomics minister German Gref and 
other experts—calls for replacing 
natural gas in the domestic market 
with hydroelectric, coal, and nuclear 
power. The utilities company UES 
currently generates about 40 percent 
of its electricity from natural gas. 
However, it seems doubtful that Rus-
sia can build the additionally re-
quired hydroelectric and nuclear 
plants quickly enough to close the 
supply gap. Further, in Gref’s view, 
if gas prices are not heavily subsi-
dized, the Russian economy will be-
come even less competitive in inter-
national markets. Part of the supply 
gap could be filled by feeding energy 
from coal-fired plants into the grid, 
and the modernization of existing 
power stations could add additional 
capacity. Coal-fired power stations 
can generally be built more quickly 
than nuclear or hydroelectric plants 
because they are less expensive and 
coal is readily available.
But Russia will also confront 
problems here, apart from the issue 
of carbon dioxide emissions. Accord-
ing to Milov, rigorous measures must 
be taken and extensive investments 
must be made in the next three 
years, before the shortfall assumes 
significant proportions. But none of 
these investments have been tackled 
so far, despite meetings at the Krem-
lin devoted to this issue. Moreover, 
experts regard the drastic expansion 
of coal use—favored by Putin—as 
unrealistic because it would cause 
insurmountable logistical problems 
in Russia extending all the way down 
to the end customer.  
European Solutions 
There are also two possible solutions 
at the European level to this looming 
crisis. The first is 
of an internal na-
ture, the second 
entails building the 
proper framework 
for an energy partnership with Rus-
sia. Internally, the European Union 
must liberalize its gas markets, de-
velop a strategy to integrate the most 
important ones, and create transpar-
ent standards that will more effec-
tively counter supply shortages. The 
European Union must also drasti-
cally expand gas stockpiling in its 
member states and work to diversify 
imports (including the construction 
of liquid gas terminals). Liberaliza-
tion will at least unlock alternative 
sources for those countries that are 
most dependent on Russian natural 
gas, and it will also open up conti-
nental Europe to new gas sources, 
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most of which have been developed 
by Great Britain. In addition to the 
Norway pipeline, Great Britain now 
has more than three liquid natural 
gas (LNG) plants in Milford Haven 
and on the Isle of Grain. With the 
inflow of LNG from Qatar, the Brit-
ish gas market will generate substan-
tial surpluses from 
2008 onward. At 
that time, more 
than 30 bcm of 
natural gas could 
be transported to 
the continental market through the 
two lines across the channel. A liber-
alized energy market could provide 
access to natural gas from British 
plants, Algeria, and Libya, which 
would at least partially close the 
Russian supply gap. 
The second European solution is 
to create a framework for granting 
foreign investors access to Russian 
plants, which would secure stable 
natural gas supplies. The European 
Union and Russia could include a 
section on energy sector cooperation 
in their Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, which is currently up 
for renegotiation. Up to now, the 
European Commission has had no 
direct power to act and has only been 
able to fall back on competition rules 
as well as regulations related to envi-
ronmental policy and the EU single 
market. At the very least, the Euro-
pean Union needs to enter into nego-
tiations with its member states in 
order to secure a mandate—but this 
would considerably delay a new 
agreement. 
This is why the European Energy 
Charter Treaty represents a much 
more favorable starting point. In a 
move that broke with previous politi-
cal practice, Russia has already en-
tered into commitments by signing 
the charter. It has expressly agreed to 
comply with the charter’s provisions, 
even before the document is ratified. 
The charter also lays down strict 
regulations on investor protection—
ones that give foreign investors the 
necessary guarantees that their in-
vestments in the energy sector will 
be safe. If the supply gap is to be 
closed, it is essential to safeguard 
foreign investment, since Russian 
capital and expertise are not suffi-
cient to develop new gas fields or to 
modernize existing plants. 
The European Union, as a collec-
tive, is in a much stronger bargaining 
position in energy relations with 
Russia than most people realize—
particularly if it insists that Russia 
observe the Energy Charter. First of 
all, Russia does not have adequate 
capital to develop its natural gas de-
posits. Second, Russia is at a disad-
vantage because it must expend ener-
gies on solving these large shortfalls. 
Third, as the Gazprom Group’s most 
important customer, the European 
Union represents the most important 
gas market for Russia. Fourth, the 
European Union could insist on clear 
reciprocity and threaten to close its 
own energy sector to Russian compa-
nies until all provisions of the Ener-
gy Charter are implemented and 
Russia opens its own markets. 
Finally, the European Union 
should insist that Russia sign the 
Energy Charter’s Transit Protocol, 
which would open Gazprom pipe-
lines to independent energy suppli-
ers and provide them with an incen-
tive not only to expand their busi-
Europe should insist that 
Russia open Gazprom 
pipelines to independent 
energy suppliers.
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ness transactions, but also to raise 
capital and sell natural gas in the 
domestic and foreign markets. All 
this presupposes that the European 
Union will speak to Russia “with 
one voice” in the future.  
Consequences of Supply Shortfalls
Out of pure self-interest, both sides—
Russia and the European Union—
should adopt measures to avert the 
imminent supply gap. This is an area 
where Russia is especially vulnerab-
le: if natural gas exports were stop-
ped and Russia nonetheless continu-
ed to subsidize domestic consumpti-
on, it would face lower foreign pro-
fits and a shrinking tax base, since 
Gazprom alone accounts for nearly 
20 percent of state tax revenues. 
Since the Russian energy sector, to-
gether with those in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan, is among the least effi-
cient in the world, supply shortfalls 
could have a devastating impact on 
industry. Exacerbating the situation 
is the fact that crude oil, minerals, 
and metals are Russia’s most impor-
tant foreign currency earners along-
side natural gas, and it is dependent 
on natural gas or on the electricity 
generated by it to produce them. For 
Russia, severe supply shortfalls pose 
an enormous threat that could set it 
on a downward spiral, not only ero-
ding the legitimacy of the Russian 
state but also erasing the economic 
gains made since 1999. 
Most of the states in Central and 
Eastern Europe also depend on natu-
ral gas from Russia. Ongoing supply 
shortfalls and the resulting high en-
ergy costs could seriously harm many 
national economies in the region. 
Shortfalls could also delay these 
states’ admission into Euroland and 
put the brakes on economic growth. 
Even those western EU states that 
do not directly depend on Russian 
natural gas would not escape un-
scathed because supply shortages in 
eastern and southern Europe would 
likely lead to higher energy prices 
throughout the European Union.  
However, from both a European 
and a strategic, economic standpoint, 
it is Germany, not Central or Eastern 
Europe, that faces 
the gravest threat. 
Dramatic reduc-
tions in natural 
gas deliveries 
could cause tremendous turbulence in 
the German economy. Due to the 
country’s size, these could spread to 
all of Europe. The situation is even 
more precarious for Germany because 
the shortfalls are likely to occur long 
before the Baltic Sea pipeline (Nord 
Stream) launched by ex-chancellor 
Schröder is connected to the network. 
Any shortfalls would hit the western 
EU states first and hardest, despite 
contractual agreements. This is espe-
cially true of Germany: as the largest 
European investor in Russia it would 
face lower and uncertain natural gas 
deliveries, and it would have reason to 
fear that its foreign investments in 
Russia would decline in value since 
any such shortfalls would cause the 
Russian economy to contract.  
The prospect of such shortfalls in 
natural gas delivery to Germany un-
derscores the danger of pursuing a bi-
lateral Sonderweg with Russia within 
the European Union. The Baltic Sea 
pipeline could prove to be a strategic 
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mistake for Germany: on the one 
hand, the pipeline means increased 
dependence on Russian natural gas 
(which, when the pipeline is com-
pleted, will account for 60 percent of 
all gas imports, as compared to 42 
percent in 2006). On the other hand, 
Germany has failed to persuade Rus-
sia to liberalize its energy markets. It 
has not secured the free flow of capi-
tal or the protection of foreign inves-
tors’ property rights, both of which 
are necessary to ensure the availabil-
ity and supply of natural gas. 
Sleepwalking Toward a Crisis
The prospect of a serious gas short-
fall, combined with the opaqueness of 
Russian energy policy, should be a 
wakeup call for policymakers in Rus-
sia and Europe. It should spur them 
to take relevant countermeasures in-
stead of uncritically trusting the 
Kremlin’s assurances. Many of these 
measures could be implemented uni-
laterally, but the most effective soluti-
on would be to establish a solid set of 
contractual regulations with Moscow 
that would allow capital to be deploy-
ed to modernize infrastructure, deve-
lop new fields, and safeguard natural 
gas flows. Yet this would require the 
Russians to completely reverse the 
energy policy they have been pursu-
ing over the past few years, which is 
highly unlikely in the foreseeable fu-
ture. Irrespective of the Russian gas 
shortfall, the European Union needs 
to broadly diversify its natural gas 
imports. Russia’s overly optimistic 
energy strategy of 2003 has already 
been rendered obsolete by the in-
crease in domestic gas consumption. 
But even if Russia manages to export 
as much gas as originally projected in 
the plan (274 bcm per year by 2030), 
exports would still fall far short of 
meeting total EU requirements of 490 
bcm per year by 2040 (280 bcm in 
2004). The bottom line is that the 
demand for gas imports in the Euro-
pean Union cannot be met by Russia 
alone. The EU requires additional 
imports from other countries and re-
gions, stepped-up efforts to improve 
energy efficiency, and the expansion 
of other energy sources to reduce gas 
consumption—including nuclear en-
ergy and an extension of nuclear 
power plant lifespans in Germany.
